PO3 Aaron Hassay 6814576 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>I am reviewing a 1990 DOD Manpower Requirement Report that is 4 years before I would join in 1994, to get a good idea of the era, at the draw down end of the Cold War as they called it, that discusses Navy difficulties hiring doctors, on ships for example where it hits the fan, but under the same exact budget, plenty of money, an amazing amount of money to hire approximately 300,000 civilian federal employees, possibly even secretaries and admin and Doctors to fully analyze the stress load on land in a secure building! But a real Doctor on a Ship well?? under this TOTAL FORCE policy of Civilian Active Duty and Reserve. I mean when you are 18 you are not even contemplating this.<br /><br /><br />Here is the Report Excerpts of interest.<br /><br />DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE<br />MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS<br />REPORT<br />FOR FY 1990<br /><br />E. Key Manpower Issues<br />1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth<br />It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing<br />an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries.<br /><br /><br />The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health<br />care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a<br />national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the<br />correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken<br />significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength<br />in FY 1989 and beyond:<br /><br /><br />C. Civilian Component<br />Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of<br />the Department&#39;s active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not<br />require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,<br />ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical<br />support; and operates and maintains military installations. They<br />contribute directly to the..readiness of the armed forces. Civilian<br />strength is projectod-V6&#39;decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent)<br />between FY ljS9-•nd FY 1990.<br /><br /><br /><br />C. Civilian Manpower<br />1. General<br />Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy&#39;s overall<br />resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our<br />fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial<br />activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&amp;E,<br />printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the<br />readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy&#39;s civilians employed at operation<br />and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in<br />supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance<br />facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support<br />in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development,<br />and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on<br />readiness.<br /><br /><br />Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people<br />needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to<br />procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenerio.<br />These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as<br />depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well<br />as associated equipment and supply support.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.<br /><br />To supplement the active component units some reserve<br />component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate<br />call up for limited periods.<br /><br />Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civilian<br />personnel, contract resources, and host nation support. Mlanpower requirements<br />are developed based on the forces required to execute our military<br />strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by<br />fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the<br />event of war,<br /><br /><br />THE TOTAL FORCE.<br /><br />The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force<br />Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to<br /><br />national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components,<br />civilian workforce, and retired military, host nation. support, and DoD<br />Contractors.-,<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />1. Navy Total Force<br />A Total Force Advocate flag officer billet within the Plans,<br />Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval<br />Operations assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component<br />manpower and units in the Navy. With analytical support from the Center<br />for Naval Analyses, potential changes in Total Force composition are<br />evaluated to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger<br />share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped<br />to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.<br />By the mid-199Ots, the US Naval Reserve (measured in manpower,<br />ships, and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful naval<br />force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active<br />Navy, this Total Force will ensure that the United States will prevail in<br />k any conflict at sea.<br /><br /><br />However, past decisions to assign significant combat and combat<br />support capabilities to the Naval Reserve were not supported by the<br />Congress when authorizing Naval Reserve end strength growth<br /><br /><br />Further, despite several years of requests for legislative authority for<br />incentives for hard-to-man units to help attract the quality and skill<br />mix needed to man the programmed growth in the Naval Reserve, such<br />authority was not granted.<br /><br />Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve<br />frigates and other important units.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />II. Significant Program Highlights<br />A. Active Component Military Manpower<br />1. General<br />Navy&#39;s highest priority continues to be the accession and<br />retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as<br />hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy<br />continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel<br />whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose<br />talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical<br />skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their<br />families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the<br />modern Navy.<br /><br /> <br /><br />B. Reserve Component Military Manpower<br />The phrase &quot;mutual support&quot; has been adopted to<br />describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions that simultaneously<br />provide direct assistance to active duty units in performing their<br />missions.<br /><br /><br />(1) General. A major component of Navy&#39;s growth toward<br />the goal of 600 ships is occurring in the Naval Reserve, now well underway<br />in the most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy<br />endeavors to use limited resources with optimum efficiency, while remaining<br />prepared to respond rapidly to crises, accomplish heavy training<br />requirements, and maintain Fleet readiness.<br /><br />Mobilization Forces Category &quot;A&quot;<br />In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category &quot;A&quot; will<br />increase by two ships to a total of 27 with the addition of two frigates<br />and one mine countermeasure ship and the loss of one destroyer.<br /><br /><br /><br />5. TAR End Strength Shortfall<br />In the 1986 Report to the Congress on Navy&#39;s Total Force,<br />Navy addressed SECNAV&#39;s policy to man FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships with<br />approximately a 30%/70% active/TAR crew mix. Between FY 1987 and FY<br />1989, programmed TAR growth has been reduced by 4,987 because of Congressional<br />actions. One thousand of these billets were originally programmed<br />for Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.<br /><br />The assignment of additional MPN assets to ensure proper manning of NRF ships places an<br />even greater demand on the constrained active duty manpower.<br /><br />The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was inaugurated<br />in FY 1984, to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel<br />mobilization requirements (E-3 and below).<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-6 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1988 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below and junior<br />officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program is meeting<br />some of these junior enlisted mobilization requirements.<br /><br /><br />So after reading this and having the ability for critical analysis having lived it I asked a few questions.<br /><br /><br /><br />I talked to one of my Marine Buddies officer type Vietnam Era, who said the Navy has special reasons like working conditions of a ship, being away from a family on continuous deployments, unlike the Air Force. Why did I have to fight and wait years because I had to prove that my spine and nerve problem may possibly be connected to the ship in deck?<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />It seems service members should be afforded equal opportunity to an actual doctor, especially lets say in an operational unit like a Navy Ship. I can speak for my experience there was no doctor on the guided missile frigate. My Navy Army Transfer at MEPS when finally reviewed in a safe place by real DOD Doctors, was disqualified at MEPS to get off the ship, for spine and musculoskeletal and psych permanent profile. My actual medical records on the ship for any of these conditions are a big. zero. It was either you were dead or fit for duty keep pumping and dumping. I was younger then so I could hit some pain thresholds, just basically blank out, I suppose in deck. But when you go the Va and work in deck and have no documentation of a spine injury on the ship, and only a a permanent profile for spine and musculoskeletal at MEPS denying your transfer off the ship, they deny your claim time and time again as it was not actually documented on the ship, where no doctors are.<br />You end up not knowing how to take care of yourself because no one assisted you then, and you eventually limp and can&#39;t walk in society as it became degenerative. But I will say this teeter machine, and a good diet, and no surgery, can be your partial cure. If you are not dead keep on fighting. Does the Navy have a harder time employing doctors as opposed the Air Force? 2021-03-11T11:53:17-05:00 PO3 Aaron Hassay 6814576 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>I am reviewing a 1990 DOD Manpower Requirement Report that is 4 years before I would join in 1994, to get a good idea of the era, at the draw down end of the Cold War as they called it, that discusses Navy difficulties hiring doctors, on ships for example where it hits the fan, but under the same exact budget, plenty of money, an amazing amount of money to hire approximately 300,000 civilian federal employees, possibly even secretaries and admin and Doctors to fully analyze the stress load on land in a secure building! But a real Doctor on a Ship well?? under this TOTAL FORCE policy of Civilian Active Duty and Reserve. I mean when you are 18 you are not even contemplating this.<br /><br /><br />Here is the Report Excerpts of interest.<br /><br />DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE<br />MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS<br />REPORT<br />FOR FY 1990<br /><br />E. Key Manpower Issues<br />1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth<br />It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing<br />an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries.<br /><br /><br />The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health<br />care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a<br />national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the<br />correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken<br />significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength<br />in FY 1989 and beyond:<br /><br /><br />C. Civilian Component<br />Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of<br />the Department&#39;s active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not<br />require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,<br />ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical<br />support; and operates and maintains military installations. They<br />contribute directly to the..readiness of the armed forces. Civilian<br />strength is projectod-V6&#39;decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent)<br />between FY ljS9-•nd FY 1990.<br /><br /><br /><br />C. Civilian Manpower<br />1. General<br />Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy&#39;s overall<br />resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our<br />fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial<br />activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&amp;E,<br />printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the<br />readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy&#39;s civilians employed at operation<br />and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in<br />supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance<br />facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support<br />in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development,<br />and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on<br />readiness.<br /><br /><br />Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people<br />needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to<br />procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenerio.<br />These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as<br />depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well<br />as associated equipment and supply support.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.<br /><br />To supplement the active component units some reserve<br />component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate<br />call up for limited periods.<br /><br />Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civilian<br />personnel, contract resources, and host nation support. Mlanpower requirements<br />are developed based on the forces required to execute our military<br />strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by<br />fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the<br />event of war,<br /><br /><br />THE TOTAL FORCE.<br /><br />The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force<br />Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to<br /><br />national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components,<br />civilian workforce, and retired military, host nation. support, and DoD<br />Contractors.-,<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />1. Navy Total Force<br />A Total Force Advocate flag officer billet within the Plans,<br />Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval<br />Operations assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component<br />manpower and units in the Navy. With analytical support from the Center<br />for Naval Analyses, potential changes in Total Force composition are<br />evaluated to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger<br />share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped<br />to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.<br />By the mid-199Ots, the US Naval Reserve (measured in manpower,<br />ships, and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful naval<br />force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active<br />Navy, this Total Force will ensure that the United States will prevail in<br />k any conflict at sea.<br /><br /><br />However, past decisions to assign significant combat and combat<br />support capabilities to the Naval Reserve were not supported by the<br />Congress when authorizing Naval Reserve end strength growth<br /><br /><br />Further, despite several years of requests for legislative authority for<br />incentives for hard-to-man units to help attract the quality and skill<br />mix needed to man the programmed growth in the Naval Reserve, such<br />authority was not granted.<br /><br />Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve<br />frigates and other important units.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />II. Significant Program Highlights<br />A. Active Component Military Manpower<br />1. General<br />Navy&#39;s highest priority continues to be the accession and<br />retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as<br />hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy<br />continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel<br />whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose<br />talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical<br />skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their<br />families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the<br />modern Navy.<br /><br /> <br /><br />B. Reserve Component Military Manpower<br />The phrase &quot;mutual support&quot; has been adopted to<br />describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions that simultaneously<br />provide direct assistance to active duty units in performing their<br />missions.<br /><br /><br />(1) General. A major component of Navy&#39;s growth toward<br />the goal of 600 ships is occurring in the Naval Reserve, now well underway<br />in the most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy<br />endeavors to use limited resources with optimum efficiency, while remaining<br />prepared to respond rapidly to crises, accomplish heavy training<br />requirements, and maintain Fleet readiness.<br /><br />Mobilization Forces Category &quot;A&quot;<br />In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category &quot;A&quot; will<br />increase by two ships to a total of 27 with the addition of two frigates<br />and one mine countermeasure ship and the loss of one destroyer.<br /><br /><br /><br />5. TAR End Strength Shortfall<br />In the 1986 Report to the Congress on Navy&#39;s Total Force,<br />Navy addressed SECNAV&#39;s policy to man FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships with<br />approximately a 30%/70% active/TAR crew mix. Between FY 1987 and FY<br />1989, programmed TAR growth has been reduced by 4,987 because of Congressional<br />actions. One thousand of these billets were originally programmed<br />for Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.<br /><br />The assignment of additional MPN assets to ensure proper manning of NRF ships places an<br />even greater demand on the constrained active duty manpower.<br /><br />The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was inaugurated<br />in FY 1984, to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel<br />mobilization requirements (E-3 and below).<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-6 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1988 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below and junior<br />officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program is meeting<br />some of these junior enlisted mobilization requirements.<br /><br /><br />So after reading this and having the ability for critical analysis having lived it I asked a few questions.<br /><br /><br /><br />I talked to one of my Marine Buddies officer type Vietnam Era, who said the Navy has special reasons like working conditions of a ship, being away from a family on continuous deployments, unlike the Air Force. Why did I have to fight and wait years because I had to prove that my spine and nerve problem may possibly be connected to the ship in deck?<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />It seems service members should be afforded equal opportunity to an actual doctor, especially lets say in an operational unit like a Navy Ship. I can speak for my experience there was no doctor on the guided missile frigate. My Navy Army Transfer at MEPS when finally reviewed in a safe place by real DOD Doctors, was disqualified at MEPS to get off the ship, for spine and musculoskeletal and psych permanent profile. My actual medical records on the ship for any of these conditions are a big. zero. It was either you were dead or fit for duty keep pumping and dumping. I was younger then so I could hit some pain thresholds, just basically blank out, I suppose in deck. But when you go the Va and work in deck and have no documentation of a spine injury on the ship, and only a a permanent profile for spine and musculoskeletal at MEPS denying your transfer off the ship, they deny your claim time and time again as it was not actually documented on the ship, where no doctors are.<br />You end up not knowing how to take care of yourself because no one assisted you then, and you eventually limp and can&#39;t walk in society as it became degenerative. But I will say this teeter machine, and a good diet, and no surgery, can be your partial cure. If you are not dead keep on fighting. Does the Navy have a harder time employing doctors as opposed the Air Force? 2021-03-11T11:53:17-05:00 2021-03-11T11:53:17-05:00 SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth 6814593 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>Thank you for the informative share shipmate <a class="dark-link bold-link" role="profile-hover" data-qtip-container="body" data-id="479445" data-source-page-controller="question_response_contents" href="/profiles/479445-po3-aaron-hassay">PO3 Aaron Hassay</a> Response by SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth made Mar 11 at 2021 11:59 AM 2021-03-11T11:59:54-05:00 2021-03-11T11:59:54-05:00 SSgt Christophe Murphy 6814626 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>At that time it was before modern day programs that do a better job at bringing in current and future doctors. But these reports come out annually. I would look at something more current than 1990.<br />Here is FY2020<br /><a target="_blank" href="https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/FINAL%20FY20%20DMRR%20Cleared%20for%20Open%20Publication.pdf?ver=2019-04-24-114457-517">https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/FINAL%20FY20%20DMRR%20Cleared%20for%20Open%20Publication.pdf?ver=2019-04-24-114457-517</a> <div class="pta-link-card answers-template-image type-default"> <div class="pta-link-card-picture"> </div> <div class="pta-link-card-content"> <p class="pta-link-card-title"> <a target="blank" href="https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/FINAL%20FY20%20DMRR%20Cleared%20for%20Open%20Publication.pdf?ver=2019-04-24-114457-517">404 - File or directory not found.</a> </p> <p class="pta-link-card-description"></p> </div> <div class="clearfix"></div> </div> Response by SSgt Christophe Murphy made Mar 11 at 2021 12:10 PM 2021-03-11T12:10:33-05:00 2021-03-11T12:10:33-05:00 Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen 6815159 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>Interesting, never thought about it! Response by Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen made Mar 11 at 2021 4:01 PM 2021-03-11T16:01:39-05:00 2021-03-11T16:01:39-05:00 COL Private RallyPoint Member 6815230 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>That report could be submitted in 2021/22 in the army and it’d still ring true. Response by COL Private RallyPoint Member made Mar 11 at 2021 4:34 PM 2021-03-11T16:34:41-05:00 2021-03-11T16:34:41-05:00 2021-03-11T11:53:17-05:00