Counterinsurgency Article by Max Boot

2015-07-03T20:21:01-04:00

Just catching up on my reading and read an interesting article in Nov/Dec Foreign Affairs. In short, he lists 10 lessons on fighting more effective counterinsurgency conflicts which don't seem to be going away. Then 10 with me paraphrasing:
1. Plan for the "after conflict phase" or Phase IV. We executed a good game plan after WWII. Not so much with recent affairs.
2. Challenge assumptions and get input on the realities from the boots on the ground - you know, the guy with the rifle interacting with the locals.
3. Get strategic - leaders should be promoted bases on their strategic intelligence as well as their operational excellence.
4. Train for more than just short conventional operations.
5. Included cultural expertise - MAVNI program or the CLT in SOF.
6. You still need the guy on the corner with a rifle - can't just rely on high-tech (sorry pilots).
7. Large bases may not be the best - love the term self licking ice cream cone.
8. Contractors need to report directly to the Senior military officer who can revoke contracts.
9. Interoperability - branches, components and with foreign contingents.
10. Counterinsurgency is a long haul affair and will include some nation building.

What's your take on all of this?

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Jul 3 at 2015 8:39 PM

2015-07-03T20:39:28-04:00

Don't spend the lions sum on nation building. Get a better understanding on the passion of the civilians, insurgents, police, and government. Create a task force of loyal indegenous forces to find and kill insurgents. Iraq is different because ISIS it the size of an army. Increase ISR capability to improve situational awareness.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Jul 5 at 2015 10:08 PM

2015-07-05T22:08:18-04:00

Fight like the insurgents.

Response by LTC Private RallyPoint Member made Mar 26 at 2018 11:29 AM

2018-03-26T11:29:37-04:00

Just read the Max Boots book Road Not Taken about Edward Lansdale. The book draws conclusions from Lansdale's intimate thoughts on what he was trying to do and what he thinks he got accomplished or not. One of the most interesting aspects of the book I found was a history of the political nature of the war from the 40's through the mid 60's from Lansdale's point of view as expressed in personal letters he wrote. The obligatory editorial commentaries from dubious sources sometimes are interjected to point the reader's conclusion in the approved direction.

Reading the book, it becomes obvious that there were numerous levels of conflict in Southeast Asia, indeed throughout the world during that volatile post WWI period where declining colonialist powers were in retrograde leaving a political and social gap that was the real focus for opposing ideologies in conflict during the period. Having done some work on Southeast Asia Intelligence Studies it always struck me that whenever Vietnam is discussed, we Americans tend to try to direct the conversation towards how America lost, what we did wrong, how we could have done better. In Lansdale's case he argues we fought the wrong war the wrong way. His self-aggrandizing assessments in his personal communications pitted him against those that disagree implying it was their mistake for not listening to him that the war was lost.

Right in front of his eyes however, he failed to see what I believe a lot of us also fail to see. His successful efforts were largely based on his attempts to fight at the political level. His failures were based on his and our inability to see the difference in those levels. If you read about the times you find roots of the conflict forming to draw the fight to the inevitable conclusion as early as the 1930's. Simply put, and underscored by the above comments on Westmorland's attrition, the North Vietnamese simply did not care if everyone in South Vietnam, or North Vietnam for that matter were killed. We were fighting a war to win hearts and minds. They were fighting a war to gain political control.

The Vietnamese clearly began preparing to fight America in the Early 1950's. It was clear that they correctly understood the post war changes and gaps in political power. They understood the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Japanese would either be filled by the Colonialist Powers, the Americans, or by the Communists. Colonel General Van Tien Dung travelled South in the mid 1950's and made an assessment that they were ready for the US intervention, what would be required to meet it, and that they could meet those requirements in order to ensure the political war stayed on track. Dung's visit was almost corollary to Maxwell Taylor's similar visit and assessment that we needed to increase the conventional presence to fight a bigger war, playing right into the political objectives of Hanoi. Essentially, We decided we could kill enough of them to break their will at a time that they didn't care how many we killed.

Winning hearts and minds would have made a difference but would not have guaranteed success as it would have mostly resulted in the death of the hearts and minds we had won. We never countered or met the enemy in combat at the Political Level. They were smarter than us at every turn. That is why we lost the Vietnam War in my opinion.