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The United States currently faces multiple national security threats in an environment of growing disorder. ISIS is executing a sophisticated global strategy that involves simultaneous efforts in Iraq and Syria, the Middle East and North Africa, and the wider world. Homegrown terrorism is increasing in the U.S. and Europe. Civil wars are intensifying in Ukraine, Yemen, and Libya, while the U.S. attempts to pivot to the Asia-Pacific. In this complex environment, it is difficult for policymakers to discern the consequences of action or inaction even in the near future.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) conducted simulation exercises on February 27 and March 16, 2015 to discover the diplomatic and military opportunities and pitfalls likely to arise in the coming months of the counter-ISIS fight. Several developments that ISW predicted during the simulation have already occurred. Identifying these scenarios and opportunities in advance can enable the U.S. and its allies to make better-informed decisions in the long-term.
ISW’s simulation focused on possible outcomes of ISIS’s regional activity. The anti-ISIS coalition is currently focused on ISIS only within Iraq and Syria. Therefore the U.S. is vulnerable to strategic surprise resulting from ISIS’s external activity. ISIS has the potential to pressure and divert allies that are critical to the U.S.-led coalition’s efforts, while continuing its own expansion program. Simulating the effects of ISIS’s endeavor in advance revealed insights that will assist in the creation of a coherent counter-ISIS strategy, rather than a piecemeal strategy formulated as crises occur.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- ISIS likely will expand regionally and project force globally in the medium term.
- Few countries are willing or able to counter ISIS as a global phenomenon. No simulation participants took multi-front action to limit ISIS’s regional expansion, even though most participants opposed ISIS. This was true even of al Qaeda.
- Avoiding or delaying action against ISIS will not necessarily preserve strategic options in the future. Instead, U.S. strategic options may narrow as adversaries grow in strength and potential allies suffer losses and turn to other partners. Participants did not consider that smaller, early action might prevent the need for more drastic steps later on. Simulation participants expressed concern about overreach and unwittingly playing into sectarian conflicts. However, participants did not recognize that their inaction might also play into those conflicts.
- The military planners in the simulation perceived that the United States does not have enough armed forces to undertake a multi-theater campaign to degrade and defeat ISIS on its own. The U.S. therefore must choose between increasing its armed forces, relying on coalition partners to achieve the defined mission, or changing the defined mission against ISIS.
- The U.S. must define the global counter-ISIS mission, and then determine the nested objectives for ISIS and each of its affiliates in support of that mission.
- In the absence of an explicit strategy to counter ISIS’s regional expansion, the U.S. and its allies likely will rely on stable and semi-stable states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. In both simulations the U.S. team’s implicit long-term strategy was to contain regional chaos as best possible through these partners, rather than adopt a campaign against extremist groups directly.
- ISIS has an asymmetric advantage because it can project force from disparate regions, potentially exploiting fissures between multiple international organizations and U.S. combatant commands.
- ISIS’s Near Abroad and Far Abroad campaigns likely will exacerbate cleavages amongst European actors, leading to interstate and intrastate divergences on security approaches and prioritization of threats.
- Turkey, Russia, and Egypt each have a disproportionate ability to spoil or facilitate counter-ISIS strategies devised by the U.S.
- The U.S. risks strategic failure even if ISIS does not attempt coherent action across global fronts. The campaigns of ISIS’s affiliates and supporters across multiple regions may distract and divide the U.S.’s allies and resources, as may other conflicts such as the one in Ukraine.
- ISIS’s global campaign likely will increase policymakers’ tolerance of frequent, high-level, and widespread violent events, creating opportunities for the United States’ adversaries.
- The U.S. and its allies cannot conduct counter-ISIS operations without considering the context of other extremist forces in the region. A strategy focused on ISIS alone likely will allow other radical actors to thrive.
READ MORE AT: http://understandingwar.org/report/isiss-global-strategy-wargame
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) conducted simulation exercises on February 27 and March 16, 2015 to discover the diplomatic and military opportunities and pitfalls likely to arise in the coming months of the counter-ISIS fight. Several developments that ISW predicted during the simulation have already occurred. Identifying these scenarios and opportunities in advance can enable the U.S. and its allies to make better-informed decisions in the long-term.
ISW’s simulation focused on possible outcomes of ISIS’s regional activity. The anti-ISIS coalition is currently focused on ISIS only within Iraq and Syria. Therefore the U.S. is vulnerable to strategic surprise resulting from ISIS’s external activity. ISIS has the potential to pressure and divert allies that are critical to the U.S.-led coalition’s efforts, while continuing its own expansion program. Simulating the effects of ISIS’s endeavor in advance revealed insights that will assist in the creation of a coherent counter-ISIS strategy, rather than a piecemeal strategy formulated as crises occur.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- ISIS likely will expand regionally and project force globally in the medium term.
- Few countries are willing or able to counter ISIS as a global phenomenon. No simulation participants took multi-front action to limit ISIS’s regional expansion, even though most participants opposed ISIS. This was true even of al Qaeda.
- Avoiding or delaying action against ISIS will not necessarily preserve strategic options in the future. Instead, U.S. strategic options may narrow as adversaries grow in strength and potential allies suffer losses and turn to other partners. Participants did not consider that smaller, early action might prevent the need for more drastic steps later on. Simulation participants expressed concern about overreach and unwittingly playing into sectarian conflicts. However, participants did not recognize that their inaction might also play into those conflicts.
- The military planners in the simulation perceived that the United States does not have enough armed forces to undertake a multi-theater campaign to degrade and defeat ISIS on its own. The U.S. therefore must choose between increasing its armed forces, relying on coalition partners to achieve the defined mission, or changing the defined mission against ISIS.
- The U.S. must define the global counter-ISIS mission, and then determine the nested objectives for ISIS and each of its affiliates in support of that mission.
- In the absence of an explicit strategy to counter ISIS’s regional expansion, the U.S. and its allies likely will rely on stable and semi-stable states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. In both simulations the U.S. team’s implicit long-term strategy was to contain regional chaos as best possible through these partners, rather than adopt a campaign against extremist groups directly.
- ISIS has an asymmetric advantage because it can project force from disparate regions, potentially exploiting fissures between multiple international organizations and U.S. combatant commands.
- ISIS’s Near Abroad and Far Abroad campaigns likely will exacerbate cleavages amongst European actors, leading to interstate and intrastate divergences on security approaches and prioritization of threats.
- Turkey, Russia, and Egypt each have a disproportionate ability to spoil or facilitate counter-ISIS strategies devised by the U.S.
- The U.S. risks strategic failure even if ISIS does not attempt coherent action across global fronts. The campaigns of ISIS’s affiliates and supporters across multiple regions may distract and divide the U.S.’s allies and resources, as may other conflicts such as the one in Ukraine.
- ISIS’s global campaign likely will increase policymakers’ tolerance of frequent, high-level, and widespread violent events, creating opportunities for the United States’ adversaries.
- The U.S. and its allies cannot conduct counter-ISIS operations without considering the context of other extremist forces in the region. A strategy focused on ISIS alone likely will allow other radical actors to thrive.
READ MORE AT: http://understandingwar.org/report/isiss-global-strategy-wargame
Institute For The Study of War
Politics
ISIS
Middle East
Terrorism
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 14
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The simplest summary of "What ISIS Wants" is - to be left alone to run their corner of the world the way that they want to run it.
The actual leadership of ISIS can have no delusion that ISIS (with its 20,000 members) is actually capable of "running the whole world and it's 7,220,000,000,000 people.
The rhetoric of "Islam will inevitably triumph." is the same as the rhetoric of "Communism will inevitably triumph.".
The actual leadership of ISIS will be quite content to take over enough territory to enable themselves to live in luxury and provide for a well funded retirement at the "Old Crooks and Dictators Retirement Lodge".
Do I believe that there are NO members of ISIS who actually believe in the rhetoric? Don't be silly - of course there are, and the actual leadership of ISIS is always on the lookout for such easily programmable, self-propelled, self-guided, weapons systems.
The actual leadership of ISIS can have no delusion that ISIS (with its 20,000 members) is actually capable of "running the whole world and it's 7,220,000,000,000 people.
The rhetoric of "Islam will inevitably triumph." is the same as the rhetoric of "Communism will inevitably triumph.".
The actual leadership of ISIS will be quite content to take over enough territory to enable themselves to live in luxury and provide for a well funded retirement at the "Old Crooks and Dictators Retirement Lodge".
Do I believe that there are NO members of ISIS who actually believe in the rhetoric? Don't be silly - of course there are, and the actual leadership of ISIS is always on the lookout for such easily programmable, self-propelled, self-guided, weapons systems.
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MSgt James Mullis
I have to disagree with some of what you said. While you are correct that the current ISIS leadership will probably be content taking over and running their little portion of the world (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria). I have seen nothing to make me believe that they will then cut off their support for the Jihad of other militant Muslim factions throughout the world. Clearly their long term goal is domination of the world by members of their religion. We can never forget that Hitler started out with a small following that rapidly increased to the point that he was able to take over most of Europe before being defeated at a great cost to the free world. Our goal needs to be to defeat or neutralize ISIS so completely that its ability to recruit new members and radicalize individual terrorists is gone.
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COL Ted Mc
MSgt James Mullis - Master Sergeant; While I agree that the "goal" is to "completely neutralize the current ISIS leadership, I'm also mindful that "A goal is NOT a plan.".
The only way to defeat an ideology is with a better ideology and that doesn't mean "In MY opinion it is a better ideology.", it means "In THEIR opinion it is a better ideology.".
FUNDAMENTALIST Islam, like Christianity was originally (and like FUNDAMENTALIST Christianity today), is a religious doctrine which aims for complete civil control. Fundamentalist Christianity has been marginalized for the simple reason that secular control of society (which includes "Freedom of Thought") is more in line with the type of society that the majority of the people want to live in. Fundamentalist Islam can only be marginalized by creating the same type of "free society" in the Middle East as was created in Europe (including the "White" colonies) and the Americas.
A "partial defeat" of ISIS will only result in the same type of consequences as the "partial defeat" of al-Qa'eda did - a new, nastier, and more "fundamentalist" enemy.
The common thread in the Middle East is "YOU are exploiting US. Go away and let US run our own lives.". Regardless of whether that thread is "reality grounded", it is believed by a significant number of people and, when you are dealing with ideas, "belief" is more important than "reality".
The only way that we can achieve a "complete defeat" of ISIS is for the people of the Middle East to abandon it - and they aren't likely to do so as long as a significant number of people hold to the belief "YOU are exploiting US." and want everyone to "Go away and let US run our own lives.".
This, unfortunately isn't likely to be achieved without abandoning about 1,000 years of foreign policy.
The only way to defeat an ideology is with a better ideology and that doesn't mean "In MY opinion it is a better ideology.", it means "In THEIR opinion it is a better ideology.".
FUNDAMENTALIST Islam, like Christianity was originally (and like FUNDAMENTALIST Christianity today), is a religious doctrine which aims for complete civil control. Fundamentalist Christianity has been marginalized for the simple reason that secular control of society (which includes "Freedom of Thought") is more in line with the type of society that the majority of the people want to live in. Fundamentalist Islam can only be marginalized by creating the same type of "free society" in the Middle East as was created in Europe (including the "White" colonies) and the Americas.
A "partial defeat" of ISIS will only result in the same type of consequences as the "partial defeat" of al-Qa'eda did - a new, nastier, and more "fundamentalist" enemy.
The common thread in the Middle East is "YOU are exploiting US. Go away and let US run our own lives.". Regardless of whether that thread is "reality grounded", it is believed by a significant number of people and, when you are dealing with ideas, "belief" is more important than "reality".
The only way that we can achieve a "complete defeat" of ISIS is for the people of the Middle East to abandon it - and they aren't likely to do so as long as a significant number of people hold to the belief "YOU are exploiting US." and want everyone to "Go away and let US run our own lives.".
This, unfortunately isn't likely to be achieved without abandoning about 1,000 years of foreign policy.
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CPT (Join to see)
COL Ted Mc - I agree with most of what you said however I cannot help but have the image of the Nazi movement pop into my head and I cannot help to think that much of what is going to come will be over a battle for resources. As each Nation grows through it's different levels history has shown there is a burgeoning need to acquire more resources and to export idealism of that nation. The end game will not come as a result of leaving them in peace to run their own country.
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What I really don't like about publications like this that you can go get on the network and download is, so can the enemy. If I were the enemy I would be studying this material day and night to find out where all the weaknesses are and exploit them on a regular basis. So they war game some scenarios and those have already taken place in the real world - no kidding. I think from now on we should just provide a welcome mat and a roadmap to our next national strategy to thwart of potential threats in the future (or) is this our way of feeding misinformation? Let’s tell them more about how we: “the military planners perceived that the United States does not have enough armed forces to undertake a multi-theater campaign to degrade and defeat ISIS on its own.” Maybe I'm just overthinking it. Well, I think its time to call my competitor in the business world and tell them what I'm planning to introduce into the market next month and see how that goes over!
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COL Ted Mc
COL Mikel J. Burroughs - Mikel; There are several points here:
[1] "The other guys" (if they are competent) probably already knew everything in the article.
[2] "The other guys" (if they are competent) probably has already "war gamed" many of the scenarios which you can think of [plus a few that you probably can't think of any more than a Bedouin can think of a blizzard].
[3] Not only is it a really good idea to be thought stronger than you actually are, there are times which it is strategically sound to be thought weaker than you actually are. (This is what we jokingly refer to as "Sucking them in.".)
[4] If you hear people saying "You know that __[fill in the blank]__, he isn't quite as dumb as you think he is." you are doing a better job than if you hear people saying "You know that __[fill in the blank]__, he isn't as dumb as you think he is." and a MUCH better job than if you hear people saying "You know that __[fill in the blank]__, he's smarter than you think he is.".
[1] "The other guys" (if they are competent) probably already knew everything in the article.
[2] "The other guys" (if they are competent) probably has already "war gamed" many of the scenarios which you can think of [plus a few that you probably can't think of any more than a Bedouin can think of a blizzard].
[3] Not only is it a really good idea to be thought stronger than you actually are, there are times which it is strategically sound to be thought weaker than you actually are. (This is what we jokingly refer to as "Sucking them in.".)
[4] If you hear people saying "You know that __[fill in the blank]__, he isn't quite as dumb as you think he is." you are doing a better job than if you hear people saying "You know that __[fill in the blank]__, he isn't as dumb as you think he is." and a MUCH better job than if you hear people saying "You know that __[fill in the blank]__, he's smarter than you think he is.".
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COL Ted Mc
COL Mikel J. Burroughs - Mikel; Thank you. I don't claim to be right all the time but do strive to have a significant excess of "right" over "wrong".
At this stage, all I can REALLY hope to do is to get people thinking out of the rut.
Even if they are thinking about something which eventually proves to be incorrect, they - at least - have found out WHY it is incorrect and will be able to apply that in other situations.
At this stage, all I can REALLY hope to do is to get people thinking out of the rut.
Even if they are thinking about something which eventually proves to be incorrect, they - at least - have found out WHY it is incorrect and will be able to apply that in other situations.
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I think one of the best analysis I've seen of ISIS points out that it's a bit of a doomsday cult. ISIS wants to drag the US into a ground war. One it thinks it will lose in a very specific location in Syria, thus meeting the Islamic criteria for the end times.
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SGT Jeremiah B.
COL Ted Mc - Thanks! That's a good read.
I'm not sure they aren't. We just don't pay any attention to them here. I seem to recall Bush meeting with a Christian organization in the run up to the Iraq invasion that very much was interested in invading for that reason. My Google-fu is failing me though. There are definitely a lot of Christian orgs that see Iraq as central to Biblical prophecy.
Have you seen this article? It covers Daesh's specific eschatology pretty well (I think) and I've grown to appreciate the Atlantic over the years.
I'm not sure they aren't. We just don't pay any attention to them here. I seem to recall Bush meeting with a Christian organization in the run up to the Iraq invasion that very much was interested in invading for that reason. My Google-fu is failing me though. There are definitely a lot of Christian orgs that see Iraq as central to Biblical prophecy.
Have you seen this article? It covers Daesh's specific eschatology pretty well (I think) and I've grown to appreciate the Atlantic over the years.
The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it.
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COL Ted Mc
SGT Jeremiah B. - Sergeant; Thanks for the article. I finally got a chance to read it through again.
Although the parallel between "Islamic State Muslims" and "Jim Jones Christians" isn't exact, it IS a useful way of looking at ISIS.
From the outside its members look like sociopathic murderers.
However (many of) its members devoutly believe that their actions are "required by God".
I also agree that "crushing ISIS" will expose it as a "false Caliphate" and take a lot of the steam out of the fanatical Islamists because "ISIS will win 'Insha'Allah'." and the defeat of ISIS clearly shows that it was NOT "God's Will" that it prevail.
Although the parallel between "Islamic State Muslims" and "Jim Jones Christians" isn't exact, it IS a useful way of looking at ISIS.
From the outside its members look like sociopathic murderers.
However (many of) its members devoutly believe that their actions are "required by God".
I also agree that "crushing ISIS" will expose it as a "false Caliphate" and take a lot of the steam out of the fanatical Islamists because "ISIS will win 'Insha'Allah'." and the defeat of ISIS clearly shows that it was NOT "God's Will" that it prevail.
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SGT Jeremiah B.
COL Ted Mc - I figure we just start the invasion in Dabiq and short-circuit the whole thing from the start. It's conveniently located right on the Turkish border.
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COL Ted Mc
SGT Jeremiah B. - Sergeant; I do have to admit that there would be a certain poetic symmetry in proving that "ISIS will win 'Insha'Allah'." translates more correctly as "ISIS has lost, 'Insha'Allah'." at the scene where Armageddon is "supposed to" happen.
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