What's your COMBAT Experience with Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) or the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)?

Sir. thank you for sharing.
When you say you used "...used a heavily abbreviated MDMP with a large leavening of SOP...," can you expound?

1) Did you generate multiple COAs, analyze them, and select the best COA? OR did you only pursue the single, directed COA?

2) Did persons attached or detailed to your staff run into hurdles integrating into staff processes that were so heavily dependent on local SOPs?

Also, I appreciate your observations regarding the standard OPORD format. Can you elaborate on experiences you and your staff had receiving or producing such orders in the Operational Environment versus experiences with Matrix- or Overlay-style OPORDs/FRAGO formats? How did doctrine play out in combat versus the schoolhouse from Division on down?

Many units pre-GWOT used to issue operational maneuver graphics based orders. Pervasive enough that Soldier and NCO boards and even Spur Rides used to incorporate interpreting graphics as a task.

No FRAGO, just an overlay with times on it. 3rd ACR used to do this for sure, that is how I heard about it. Especially if it is the pursuit of an already fleeing enemy, or a well understood and articulated branch plan. Especially one that was walked through during the CAR.

CALL products from the early 90s would be instructive if this is something one is interested in.

LTC John Wilson - 1. Yes, we normally considered more than one COA. The analysis part was more of a logical discussion with key staff and with red team / devil's advocate perspective thrown in. 2. Rotations of staff / members of the task force did happen, but I recall everybody caught on very fast, as in one or two iterations. 3. Orders were VERY graphics oriented with some boxes for commander's intent, priorities of fire / work etc... along the lines of what LTC Mackay refers to. Written portions were absolutely minimized. When we received missions, which really wasn't that common for me, they were also very much overlay orders with verbal elaboration. Once in the AO, I did not publish or receive a single written OPORD. I strongly recommend focusing your staff training on overlay orders with only the most necessary narrative supplementation. Full OPORDs are fine when organizing your unit to deploy or redeploy, but not really useful in a true tactical environment unless it is a very deliberate operation.

Did you all ever follow the Rational Choice Decision Making core of MDMP doctrine? In other words: did you generate multiple COAs, analyze them, and select the best COA? OR did you only pursue the single, directed COA?

LTC John Wilson we built sustainment COAs for the operational or tactical COAs to evaluate them, then what if’ed the sustainment branches of the selected COA. I can answer this better when I’m home next week and can use a keyboard

I look forward to future comment. Thank you.

LTC John Wilson - Really not sure what you are trying to get from all this, but here is my refined response. Bear in mind this goes back almost 20 years for me. Whether I briefed on butcher block or a slide etc...all lost to the ages at this point.
OPERATION: Cobra II, which would become OIF
ROLE: I was the Company Commander of 95th Maint Co, the only Calibration and Repair Company for TMDE in the free world. 95th was a strategic level asset with detachments all over the world. We were a direct report to Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Army Materiel Command.

MDMP Used: Abbreviated. We built the enterprise level sustainment COA around the COA we were told to plan around by ARCENT. Focus was on branch plans and trigger criteria. Details below.
SITUATION#1: We started working operational level planning for Iraq in 2002 and refined it until 2003. and preparation for said operation we did deliberate MDMP at the MACOM level
- AMCOM we did abbreviated MDMP to generate the support annexes for Cobra II. It was one COA, the most likely operational COA and we did requirements, capabilities, shortfalls, workarounds, timing, and surpluses. Fun fact, I am pretty sure the TMDE support Annex still bears the code name Operation Slippery Weasel in the upper right hand corner. No one seemed to notice it in staffing….
- The AMC instinct is to always flood the zone with assets. I had to give a bottom up appetite suppressant to avoid over committing the 20 available detachments, 20 non-splittable equipment sets and lone Company HQ between OIF, OEF, adhoc recurring missions ISO CENTCOM, and the 24/7 mission in Korea. CENTCOM had over half my detachments either deployed or staged to deploy along with the adhoc rotational requirements. As it played out, I had 10 detachments in OIF and OEF with most of the others, to include a team being pulled from Korea, on BPT orders to deploy. The basic planning tenent was 1 x Area TMDE Support Team (ATST) AN/GSM 287 set per division, and 1 x Corps Level ATST AN/GSM 286 set for EAD aviation and area support. I had to pump the breaks on planners trying to assign ATSTs that didn’t exist to BNs and BDEs. I had to explain “Area Support” in a direct support world.


HOW IT CAME OUT: 7/10. The value was in the “planning” and not the plan as the SECDEF hucked the plans out the window, most notably the TFFDL. The strategic look left, throw right of the Northern otion through Turkey with 4th ID threw things sideways.In the end, we blew down the door and then looked at each other and said now what. The spontaneous Iraqi led government never materialized.

SITUATION #2: OIF I circa May/June 2003
- as part of AMC SWA we did abbreviated MDMP in support of the operational and strategic COA when we did that first rotation through the next 6 -18 months.
- We were given 3 COAs to plan support for, but by day 2 of the planning, we were refocused on one open ended COA. We had lots of RFIs and assumptions.
- I was successful in illustrating that we would be out of Shlitz by this point with the projected RIP churn that I was green lit to develop a contract SOW for LOGCAP execution.

ROLE: I was the Company Commander of 95th Maint Co TMDE, now OPCON to AMC SWA and then to AMC Iraq. We contributed to their overarching plan.

HOW IT CAME OUT: 6/10. The value was in the “planning” and not the plan. The draw down of forces COA never really materialized from our stand point. Bearing in mind, The basic planning tenent was 1 x Area TMDE Support Team (ATST) AN/GSM 287 set per division, and 1 x Corps Level ATST AN/GSM 286 set for EAD aviation and area support.

OPERATION: OEF 2008-2009
MDMP Used: Directed COA, details below
ROLE: SPO and BN XO 801st BSB 4BCT 101st Airborne. Assigned to RC East P2KGLW

SITUATION #3:
- As a BDE Staff and BNs we did concurrent MDMP. It was one central COA to move us into theater and RIP. There were directed branches based on FOB/COP additions. Had to grind out changes to concept of support due to the COA being a boot for boot RIP with 4BCT 82nd ABN, a unit that was larger than us. Particularly the 782BSB which had a 60 pax rigger detachment. Had to figure out sustainment without a quarter of the BSB. We also lost one 2-506 IN BN to RC South as a TCF until mid way through the deployment. Until then we had a BN from the 173rd, We would ultimately occupy 50 FOBs and COPs in 6 provinces spread over 28,000 square miles in bronze age infrastructure as a BCT. We also had to form a provisional BN with borrowed field grades and mixed matched platoons to cover Wardak.

- we reconvened for a few major BDE level operations including redeployment, which was a directed COA as the pax flow was essentially directed by higher and the equipment flow was mostly going by ground to the SPOD in Pakistan with brief looting stops enroute. We had a handful of containers move by air (TAT). The largest BDE level operation was unplanned as it was a response to a DUSTWUN in the Tangi Valley. Much of the MDMP being done was with the 2x Afghan Corps we were aligned with. Sustainment planning with them was frustrating and largely fruitless. Every time they hit the ground on an air assault we had to no notice emergency resupply them or they were going to "quit".

HOW IT CAME OUT: 9/10. Our Brigade absolutely took it to the bad guys. Our limitation was we were spread 3mm thick. Our BSB and the 101st SB did amazing things logistics wise. Flew the rotors off contracted rotary wing and fixed wing. Rigging and dropping LCLA bundles. Some Herculean Combat Logistics Patrols.

Did you all ever follow the Rational Choice Decision Making core of MDMP doctrine? In other words: did you generate multiple COAs, analyze them, and select the best COA? OR did you only pursue the single, directed COA? Neve heard of Rational Choice Decision Making. We tailored MDMP based on time and resources available. When time and resources are short, the commanders take more of an active role in the process employing their tacit knowledge and their visualization of the battlefield. Also, when you are in a monstrously large organization like AMC, COA development and selection is pushed down to subordinate organizations, as they are just attributes of a larger COA.

OPERATION: ISAF
SITUATION #4
While in NATO I was deployed to ISAF HQ. I was the DCHOPS in the CJ33. We did not do MDMP, but the remainder led by the CJ5 and 35 used the Joint Operational Planning Process, cut orders, and plopped to the 33. “The” CJ35 would provide planning guidance where some were deliberate JOPP using the boards, centers and cells to provide input, others were simply grabbing the nearest US LTC and telling them to write an order by lunch. They were barely orders, as NATO focuses on coordination vice command and control. I wrote a handful of orders which were more akin to policy than “Unit X, go here, take this hill”. I wrote several MOA/MOUs with other agencies. They were staffed but no formal MDMP was conducted. Staffing on a multi-national level is dicey at best. Most of my day to day was answering RFIs from PAO (to answer the NY Times for the 8th time on the same topic), building products to answer COMISAF questions and battle tracking in the Situational Awareness Center and feeding COMISAF’s Situational Awareness Room. Though I am not named (I was among the nameless and faceless in the HQ, her writing tended to focus on the CIG), many of the products, analysis, and events I handled are detailed in Broadwell's book "All In".

OUTCOME: 7/10. Given that insurgency is really fought at the lowest tactical levels, the RCs really ran the day to day operations based on intel, opportunities, and a relatively unchanged set of logical objectives. ISAF was there to be the strategic interface, engage with the Afghan NCA, mentorship at the national government level, launched a handful of programs and initiatives for capacity building, strategic power build of GIROA’s security forces, alliance/coalition tending, and other high vis activity. It was not deciding: “What is the best way to man COP Upptyfrance in central Logar province”. The 3 Star Operational command (IGC) didn’t even really do that.

Sir. I am grateful for your reply. I hope to hear more from other on their experience.

I was first taught the MDMP back in the early 1990's when it was known as the DDMP. I have worked with, studied the MDMP, and taught it to allied foreign military. But even my extensive past experience with the doctrine is anecdotal and does not extend the its use in the GWOT.

If I may ask: How often did your MITT execute the full MDMP, and how well did the "best" COA selected from the menu of COAs you developed fit the circumstances that unfolded in execution?