Posted on Apr 15, 2015
Are you/we surprised? U.S. Soldiers, Back in Iraq, Find Security Forces in Disrepair....
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Yes, we did the best we could to train and hand over security and policing to the GOI, within the timelines we were given... But did, we leave too soon?
Did you have confidence in the long term prognosis when you left?
Remember, before you comment/opine... We are still in Germany, Japan, Korea etc... Lasting change takes a long time to take root.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/world/middleeast/iraq-military-united-states-forces-camp-taji.html?_r=2
"Iraq’s army looked good on paper when the Americans left, after one of the biggest training missions carried out under wartime conditions. But after that, senior Iraqi officers began buying their own commissions, paying for them out of the supply, food and payroll money of their troops. Corruption ran up and down the ranks; desertion was rife."
Did you have confidence in the long term prognosis when you left?
Remember, before you comment/opine... We are still in Germany, Japan, Korea etc... Lasting change takes a long time to take root.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/world/middleeast/iraq-military-united-states-forces-camp-taji.html?_r=2
"Iraq’s army looked good on paper when the Americans left, after one of the biggest training missions carried out under wartime conditions. But after that, senior Iraqi officers began buying their own commissions, paying for them out of the supply, food and payroll money of their troops. Corruption ran up and down the ranks; desertion was rife."
Iraq
ISIS
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 23
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I was on an Iraqi National Police Transition Team in 2006 and saw first hand living with the Iraqis that the mission of training and advising them would take upwards of 20 years minimum. The Iraqi officers "buying" their commissions was going on back then. "Ghost" Soliders/Policemen on the payroll was SOP. Maintenance was only conducted after the truck/vehicle broke down.
Unlike Germany, Korea, and Japan I don't believe the Iraq/Afghanistan culture is capable of "righting" itself in a form of a stabilized civilization. I really don't believe any Islam culture is capable of doing it themselves. You could point to the U.A.E., Qatar, Saudi Arabia and say that those countries are doing well but, those countries are propelled by Third Country Nationals that are treated like slaves, there are more TCNs in those countries than indigenous people, plus they have an incredible amount of money.
We definitely left Iraq too early, we put too much blood, money, and resources into the country to not remain until the mission (whatever that was) was complete. I am currently in Afghanistan and although we are maintaining the troop numbers throughout the year, drawdown is still the main focus. We are making the same mistake here that we did in Iraq.
If we leave we need to just stay gone and not come back. If we are staying we need to stay and see it through, however long it takes.
Unlike Germany, Korea, and Japan I don't believe the Iraq/Afghanistan culture is capable of "righting" itself in a form of a stabilized civilization. I really don't believe any Islam culture is capable of doing it themselves. You could point to the U.A.E., Qatar, Saudi Arabia and say that those countries are doing well but, those countries are propelled by Third Country Nationals that are treated like slaves, there are more TCNs in those countries than indigenous people, plus they have an incredible amount of money.
We definitely left Iraq too early, we put too much blood, money, and resources into the country to not remain until the mission (whatever that was) was complete. I am currently in Afghanistan and although we are maintaining the troop numbers throughout the year, drawdown is still the main focus. We are making the same mistake here that we did in Iraq.
If we leave we need to just stay gone and not come back. If we are staying we need to stay and see it through, however long it takes.
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COL Charles Williams
Hooah CSM (Join to see). That was my world too.... Police Chief, Prison Warden by Day, Insurgent by night....
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Iraqis are not Americans.
Iraqi Soldiers are not American Soldiers.
You can put lipstick and pearls on a pig....
This is not to say the Iraqis are bad people. They aren't. But they just don't have the same (for lack of better word) background we do.
Expecting them to go from where they were to where we are, was an unreasonable mission. When we "liberated them" we obligated ourselves to their protection for generations. Not years, not decades, but generations.
Edit: word
Iraqi Soldiers are not American Soldiers.
You can put lipstick and pearls on a pig....
This is not to say the Iraqis are bad people. They aren't. But they just don't have the same (for lack of better word) background we do.
Expecting them to go from where they were to where we are, was an unreasonable mission. When we "liberated them" we obligated ourselves to their protection for generations. Not years, not decades, but generations.
Edit: word
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LTC Paul Labrador
Absolutley. Incidentally, I think maybe the Iraqis wanted the "conquerer model"...at least initially. Where we lost a lot of good will among the general populace was when we failed "to make the trains run on time" (so to speak) because we were too hands off intially. Good discussion!
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Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS
LTC Paul Labrador For lack of a better word, it would have solved it with the "Machismo" model. "We have more money, and Guns. We're in Charge." It likely would have sped up the rebuild & turnover process by a good 5-10 years.
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The onion has been peeled back in Iraq. It is rife with poor leadership, indifferent soldiers, corruption, creating fake accounts to siphon money to the military leaders, inability to coordinate and maintain vehicles and equipment. Giving them high tech weapons and vehicles and maintaining them is a foreign concept to them. This is just one of three parts of Clausewitz's Trinity. An M1 is not something you just jump in and drive away.
I think the British had it right, to fight insurgency fight like them and kill them. The challenge now is the insurgency has taken new objectives due it's size being comparable to a small army.
I think the British had it right, to fight insurgency fight like them and kill them. The challenge now is the insurgency has taken new objectives due it's size being comparable to a small army.
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SFC Mark Merino
MAJ Ken Landgren I agree for the most part. We are in a street fight using professional boxing rules.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
The British military used a doctrine of minimalism to fight insurgents that is quite counter to the U.S. doctrine.
The British often conducted counterinsurgency operations with Regiments which were half the size of Brigades. These Regiments had close understanding of the AO due to ability to conducted protracted operations, which gave them the opportunity to understand the terrain and build important ties with the indigenous society fighting the insurgents. This is quite unlike U.S. approach of using Divisions and Corps. They strived to use minimal force necessary to achieve victory.
The mission for local security was conducted by local police with requisite assistance from the regiment. Funds were minimal, therefore, not much was destroyed to be fixed later, which simplified and reduced the need for Civil Affairs and nation building.
One of the principles of counterinsurgency is technology is not the be all, end all. The British soldiers in unison fought like the insurgents. They conducted ambushes and tracked the insurgents to their safe havens capture or kill them regardless of the austerity of the terrain.
The British often conducted counterinsurgency operations with Regiments which were half the size of Brigades. These Regiments had close understanding of the AO due to ability to conducted protracted operations, which gave them the opportunity to understand the terrain and build important ties with the indigenous society fighting the insurgents. This is quite unlike U.S. approach of using Divisions and Corps. They strived to use minimal force necessary to achieve victory.
The mission for local security was conducted by local police with requisite assistance from the regiment. Funds were minimal, therefore, not much was destroyed to be fixed later, which simplified and reduced the need for Civil Affairs and nation building.
One of the principles of counterinsurgency is technology is not the be all, end all. The British soldiers in unison fought like the insurgents. They conducted ambushes and tracked the insurgents to their safe havens capture or kill them regardless of the austerity of the terrain.
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COL Charles Williams
Thanks MAJ Ken Landgren SFC Mark Merino SPC Angel Guma . All good comments. I will always think of those we lost, and who were injured for life, and wonder, life my Vietnam brothers if it is was all worth it.
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