50 years ago today, May 31, in sunny Vietnam-land - Where were you?

2015-05-31T08:56:09-04:00

U.S. planes bomb an ammunition depot at Hoi Jan, west of Hanoi, and try again to drop the Than Hoa highway bridge.

These raids were part of Operation Rolling Thunder, which had begun in March 1965. President Lyndon B. Johnson had ordered the sustained bombing of North Vietnam to interdict North Vietnamese transportation routes in the southern part of North Vietnam and slow infiltration of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam. In July 1966, Rolling Thunder was expanded to include North Vietnamese ammunition dumps and oil storage facilities as targets. In the spring of 1967, it was further expanded to include power plants, factories, and airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

The White House closely controlled operation Rolling Thunder and President Johnson occasionally selected the targets himself. From 1965 to 1968, about 643,000 tons of bombs were dropped on North Vietnam. A total of nearly 900 U.S. aircraft were lost during Operation Rolling Thunder. The operation continued, with occasional suspensions, until President Johnson halted it on October 31, 1968, under increasing domestic political pressure.

Response by LCpl Mark Lefler made May 31 at 2015 9:15 AM

2015-05-31T09:15:01-04:00

10 yrs too soon.

Response by SSG Roger Ayscue made May 31 at 2015 9:48 AM

2015-05-31T09:48:19-04:00

I was eating baby food and discovering my toes.

Response by Capt Seid Waddell made May 31 at 2015 11:45 AM

2015-05-31T11:45:01-04:00

The micro-managing of tactical decisions by Washington continued on in the war.

I was a Weapons Controller on Monkey Mountain, outside of Da Nang.

Late on the night shift - don't recall the date, but I believe it was in early 1971 - a couple of Migs jumped one of our FACs over the Plain of Jars in Laos. The FAC declared emergency and was jinking his heart out to avoid being shot down.

Lion Control in Ubon Thailand was controlling the OV-10 Bronco FAC, and scrambled two F-4s out of U-Tapao and two more out of Da Nang to run the intercept.

The F-4s from Da Nang made the intercept and had a lock-on to the Migs, and asked permission to go hot. The controller at Lion told them to stand by, and contacted the TACC-North Sector on Monkey Mountain for permission to go hot.

The TACC NS said to stand by and went to the TACC in Saigon for permission. The TACC in Saigon said to stand by and went further up the line to get permission to open fire on the Migs.

Meanwhile, the Migs were jinking and heading straight for Vinh airfield with the F-4s on their tails with a lock-on. The word finally came down the chain that if the F-4s had a Talley, they were cleared hot.

However, at zero-dark-thirty it is impossible to get a visual confirmation; a communist afterburner looks much like an American afterburner in the dark.

We had positive radar contact from the time of the attack on our FAC, the Migs were not squawking, were taking evasive action, and were headed for a communist airfield, but the civilians up the chain were not convinced that the military could tell friend from foe and were worried that we might shoot our own planes down.

The F-4s followed the Migs down to the runway, flew over them as they landed, and climbed out over water to return to base.

The Navy carrier commander was operating with a good deal more autonomy than the Air Force, and the commander on Yankee Station was listening to the radio chatter and was anxious to kill some Migs. He had his Mig CAPs up and ready to go when two targets busted up out of Vinh airfield over water and headed south along the coast. His Mig CAP was on them quickly and got a lock-on - to our F-4s - who were not squawking because they had been over enemy territory.

The F-4s got the indication that they had been locked onto, squawked emergency, and came out over Guard telling the Navy fighters to hold their fire - they were friendlies.

This is what the Migs would have done had they been friendlies, but the higher-ups making the decision for the initial intercept lacked the tactical information to make informed decisions.

The further up the line one goes from the tactical situation the less one knows the important details required to make valid decisions, and the more likely the decisions made will be guided by politics.

It is my opinion that the civilian leaders need to give the military the goals to be achieved, and then should step away and let the military decide how to accomplish the goals without being micro-managed by people with insufficient knowledge to do the job effectively.

Response by 1LT David Moeglein made May 31 at 2015 12:17 PM

2015-05-31T12:17:52-04:00

I was a young kid during the Vietnam era. My father was a funeral director. Because it was a family business, I would accompany him on road trips where it was appropriate to do so. I remember going to the airport with him to receive the body of a US soldier, who was killed in action while in Vietnam.

On a side note, I am very proud of the way my father has helped families. His work won a national award from the Department of Defense. A pathologist he worked with told him he should have been a plastic surgeon. He made it possible for families to see their loved ones in an open casket, where 99% of the time that wouldn't have been the case.

Response by SFC Kenneth Hunnell made May 31 at 2015 1:58 PM

2015-05-31T13:58:27-04:00

I was almost 5 years old

Response by SFC Boots Attaway made May 31 at 2015 5:31 PM

2015-05-31T17:31:11-04:00

I was 8 and 10 years from my first enlistment.

Response by SMSgt Lawrence McCarter made Feb 4 at 2017 5:54 AM

2017-02-04T05:54:34-05:00

In 1968 and early 1969 I was stationed at Da Nang Air Base where I worked base perimeter. This picture is Me in one of the leftover old French bunkers on one of those posts. Da Nang was the home of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing that flew the F4 Phantoms You mention. I was assigned to the 366th Security Police Squadron there. Although I didn't work at Monkey Mountain I have been up there with a SSgt Elrod who did work there with the USAF Security Police in 1968, quite a view from there. The Washington micro management sure cost a lot of lives and the So called MACV Rules of engagement were appreciated by Charles, He had no such restrictions. That also got a lot of people killed.

Response by SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth made Feb 4 at 2017 8:29 AM

2017-02-04T08:29:33-05:00

I was in 2nd grade. More than likely in class.

Response by SMSgt Roger Horton made Feb 17 at 2017 6:34 PM

2017-02-17T18:34:07-05:00

I was in Chu Lai, South Vietnam getting ready to rotate back. I might have been on Hill 55 but I don't remember the exact date I was there. Two 155 self propels crossed the metal bridge between Chu Lai and Hill 55 caving it in. Had to take a water point for water as no vehicles was allowed to cross bridge.

Response by Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen made Feb 17 at 2017 6:59 PM

2017-02-17T18:59:45-05:00

Junior in college, 4 years away from flying B-52 missions in Vietnam.

Response by SPC Lyle Montgomery made May 20 at 2022 12:17 PM

2022-05-20T12:17:41-04:00

I was in Nam a little later than what you described. I volunteered for the draft and was inducted on 9/10/ 1969. I served as an Army grunt in Quang Tri in 1970. The war was winding down,They said , but It was The same fighting the enemy as before. It was not winding down for us.

Response by MAJ Hugh Blanchard made May 20 at 2022 11:03 PM

2022-05-20T23:03:27-04:00

May 31, 1972 I was one week away from enlisting in the U.S. Army as an E-1. Shortly thereafter I was at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to begin Basic Combat Training. All of our Drill Sergeants served together in Vietnam in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and they were a very professional group.