Posted on Dec 31, 2015
Is the military losing its edge in COIN (Counterinsurgency Operations)?
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I remember playing some army games on the computer as a child. How to get better? Back then it was search the internet for MOUT. My uninformed idea was that urban ops was the high speed stuff the military did.
Forget about all that though, I mean many people play games, even still today. Pieing corners is like day one stuff for an 8 yr old now.
What's significant:
Ok, traditional tactics are taught and yes urban ops too. In reality it's counterinsurgency that is the focus. Correct me if I'm wrong, the Military lead COIN. The system was being followed/carried out, and ever changing to remain current. If perhaps the ideas from the military are going unheard, the cutting edge of COIN is dull?
Forget about all that though, I mean many people play games, even still today. Pieing corners is like day one stuff for an 8 yr old now.
What's significant:
Ok, traditional tactics are taught and yes urban ops too. In reality it's counterinsurgency that is the focus. Correct me if I'm wrong, the Military lead COIN. The system was being followed/carried out, and ever changing to remain current. If perhaps the ideas from the military are going unheard, the cutting edge of COIN is dull?
Posted 9 y ago
Responses: 4
To be honest, SPC James Harsh I feel that we lost our COIN edge quite some time ago when confusion set in as to whether we were conducting COIN, Wide-Area Security Operations, Stability Operations, Security Assistance, or Peace Operations. Sometimes all at the same time by different units.
In my mind, where a lot of our energy and effort got wasted was in having competing and contrary lines of effort all arguing over resources and importance.
We lost our minds at the senior level, abdicating Unity of Effort in order to forge some kind of "consensus".
I'm all for getting buy-in and trying different approaches, but lines of effort are so intertwined that you need a decoder ring to figure them out. That is commander business.
In my mind, where a lot of our energy and effort got wasted was in having competing and contrary lines of effort all arguing over resources and importance.
We lost our minds at the senior level, abdicating Unity of Effort in order to forge some kind of "consensus".
I'm all for getting buy-in and trying different approaches, but lines of effort are so intertwined that you need a decoder ring to figure them out. That is commander business.
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The American paradigm for winning against insurgency was establishing a democracy, a civil capacity, and a strong military. In 2011 we thought we completed those tasks and left Iraq at the behest of the Iraqi leader. Here are some thoughts on COIN:
1. We are culturally stupid. What do you expect when a Shia Prime Minister discriminates against enclaves of Sunni Iraqis? This hate is the status quo for a thousand years and ISIS became the legitimate rulers in Sunni areas.
2. We should have conducted large joint offensive operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to kill the insurgents. COIN is predicated on security, but it is difficult to achieve when the insurgents are alive and have time and space to use asymmetric warfare.
1. We are culturally stupid. What do you expect when a Shia Prime Minister discriminates against enclaves of Sunni Iraqis? This hate is the status quo for a thousand years and ISIS became the legitimate rulers in Sunni areas.
2. We should have conducted large joint offensive operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to kill the insurgents. COIN is predicated on security, but it is difficult to achieve when the insurgents are alive and have time and space to use asymmetric warfare.
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Well I am currently here in the middle of it. COIN is gone. Out the window. We are now playing a Train/Advise/Assist role. Times they are a-changing. Changing back to the old stuff... smh.
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